Love thy neighbour (and legalise their status) – Colombia and its approach to migrants from Venezuela

Colombia was recently praised for recognising what should be obvious: the arrival, over the last couple of years, of some 1.5 million migrants and refugees from its neighbour Venezuela might be Venezuela’s loss, but it is Colombia’s gain.  Colombia chose to maximise the benefits it will gain from the new arrivals by giving legal status to Venezuelan migrants and refugees.  Venezuelans can use the residency permit to find work legally and to access public services.

In this blog I look at why so many Venezuelans are running from their country and at how Colombia has responded, both in managing the new migrant community and in tackling an often-forgotten impact of migration: the increased risk of statelessness.

 

Why are Venezuelans leaving their country?

Venezuela has faced growing political discontent, hyperinflation, power cuts, and food and medicine shortages.  The election, in 2013, of president Nicolás Maduro did not improve things. If anything, things got worse.  The economy tanked while Maduro and the opposition parties struggled for power.  In the lead up to the 2018 presidential election, which Maduro claims to have won, opposition candidates were prevented from running against him and several were arrested.  The election results were disputed, including by the opposition-controlled National Assembly.

For a period of time after January 2019, the opposition leader Juan Guaidó declared himself constitutional president, and even had the support of more than 50 states, including the US, and many countries in Latin America.  Guaidó, however, had limited actual power.  This is because during Maduro’s first term in office, power had been gradually moved away from the National Assembly and concentrated into the hands of a National Constituent Assembly, loyal to Maduro ¹.

 

The crisis continues with no imminent resolution

The power struggles mean that the problems impacting ordinary people, such as chronic underinvestment in infrastructure and US sanctions against Venezuela’s oil sector which have greatly reduced government revenue, have continued unabated.  As well as the everyday hardships caused by the collapse of the economy, the Maduro regime has been implicated in perpetrating systemic violence and human rights abuses against the people including arbitrary killings, torture and disappearances ².

There is not much left for Venezuelans and their families but to undertake the arduous journey, travelling on foot for days over mountainous roads to reach Bogotá.

 

The Venezuelan crisis and migration to Colombia

Colombia, as Venezuela’s neighbour, has taken in some 1.5 Venezuelans.  But this is only a proportion of those that have left the troubled country.  Plan International estimates that, because of the current crisis, 5000 Venezuelans leave their country every day ³. UNHC estimates that around 5.4 million people have left to escape violence, insecurity and threats since 2014.  Those that stay face lack of food, medicine and access to essential services ⁴.

Covid-19 makes the situation even more precarious, both for Venezuelans that have remained at home and for those that have had to leave ⁵.  UNHCR describes the Venezuelan exodus as one of the largest displacement crises in the world.

 

Colombia’s approach

In February 2021, the Colombian president, Ivan Duque, announced that Venezuelans who had sought refuge in Colombia would be given legal status. The government will enable each migrant to obtain a 10-year temporary protection status.  This status would entitle Venezuelans in Colombia to work legally as well as access public services such as health and education ⁶.  This will no doubt benefit the Venezuelan families who have had to leave their homes.

What is unusual about Colombia’s decision, is that the government has spoken openly about the positive effect of migration to Colombia.  This is not a narrative that we hear very often ⁷.  Duque was clear on the economic boost from Venezuelans taking formal employment, paying taxes and contributing to social security ⁸.

Duque also recognises that documenting migrants allows the state to adapt its security and social policies ⁹.  Identity and documentation programmes are frequently promoted as a way to ensure both resident migrants and citizens are taken into account in the provision of basic services or in the implementation of state policies.  For more information see my blogs on legal identity and on the use of registration systems to plan and deliver public services.

 

The statelessness factor

One further problem that will need to be resolved is the risk of statelessness faced by children born in Colombia to Venezuelan parents.

Children born outside of Venezuela to Venezuelan parents can obtain Venezuelan citizenship.  But there are administrative hurdles to overcome. The child must be registered either in Venezuela or in a Venezuelan consulate abroad ¹⁰.  Venezuela severed diplomatic relationships with Colombia in February 2018, and they have not yet resumed ¹¹.  The registration cannot, therefore, take place in Colombia.  For many, going back to Venezuela is not currently an option.  Any child that cannot be registered cannot claim Venezuelan citizenship.

Nor can these children claim Colombian citizenship.  Under Colombian law, at least one parent must have either Colombian citizenship or permanent residence ¹².  The bar is set too high when it comes to the children of Venezuelan migrants.  Although the proposal to provide migrants with legal status is positive, that status alone is not sufficient to enable their children to benefit from Colombian citizenship as permitted under the Colombian Constitution.

 

Colombia understands what it takes to mitigate the risk of statelessness

To manage the risk of statelessness caused by migration, Colombia introduced a new policy to ensure that children of Venezuelan heritage are not left in a stateless limbo.  The government decreed in August 2019 that children born in Colombia to Venezuelan parents would be eligible for Colombian citizenship.  This discretionary policy and the temporary amendment to Colombia’s nationality law ¹³ applies to children of Venezuelan parents born in Colombia between August 2019 and August 2021 ¹⁴.

It is estimated that some 24,000 children born in Colombia since August 2015 will benefit from this discretionary policy on citizenship ¹⁵. This is a hight estimate, however, as it is possible that many Venezuelan parents are not aware that their children are, or are at risk of being, stateless ¹⁶.

The time-limited changes to the nationality law are not a full answer to the statelessness problem caused by migration.  The Colombian Constitution and Colombia’s citizenship law does not follow the jus soli principle of citizenship acquisition ¹⁷.  The temporary provisions in favour of the children of Venezuelan migrants does not change the blood ties normally needed under Colombia’s constitutional arrangements.  The amendments the citizenship law are due to expire in August 2021 and it is not clear yet if they will be renewed.

 

Keeping up momentum

A more coherent approach to combatting statelessness is needed in Latin America.  Recent steps forward include the adoption of the 2019 Quito Process.  The Quito Process calls for Latin American nations to accede to the 1954 Convention the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, adopt safeguards to ensure that every child born within the territory of a Latin American country acquires a nationality at birth and invites states to adopt a statelessness determination procedure.  On the importance of such a procedure, see my blogs here and here.

Colombia is already making good progress against the Quito Process recommendations.  It is party to both Statelessness Conventions.  It is making efforts to identify sectors of society where children are at risk of statelessness and has amended its laws to ensure that those children are not left stateless.

To ensure that long-term policies and laws continue to address the risk of statelessness caused by migration, Colombia needs to keep up the momentum and make good on its promise to implement a statelessness determination procedure.  As we have seen recently, from the efforts of the Kyrgyz Republic to reduce statelessness, not only decisive but sustained action is needed.